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chargeable with knowledge that their acts were wrongful. A
dozen states have accomplished a similar result-to varying degrees-by legislation. 9 In Louisiana and in other states which
regard civil damages as purely compensatory, it would be difficult
to so limit the rule other than by statute, because under such a
theory there can be no reason for distinguishing wilful and negli20

gent torts.

In sum, the Louisiana rule appears to be that a right of contribution arises between co-tortfeasors (whether wilful or negligent) if, and only if, their joint responsibility has been determined judicially. Such a judicial determination can be had only
by a judgment in solido against them in the original tort action.
There is no way in which one condemned alone may establish
the concurrent negligence of his fellow. It is submitted, however,
that there is no real reason why parties who have been condemned alone for merely negligent offenses should be denied the
privilege of legally establishing the liability of fellow tortfeasors
and obtaining contribution. If the merely negligent tortfeasor
were given an action against concurrent wrongdoers, no fundamental principle of justice would be violated and liability would
be placed upon all the parties at fault. The increased adoption
of "comparative negligence" principles indicates that modern
legal thought favors such proportionate allocation of responsiB. B. T., Jr.
bility.

WILLS-INSURANCE PROCEEDS-DEBT EXEMPTION NOT APPLICABLE WHEN CONTRARY TO EXPRESS INTENTION OF TESTATOR-The in-

sured directed in his will that the proceeds of his insurance pol292 Pa. 354, 141 AtI. 231 (1928). Accord: Mills v. Cox, 28 Cour Sup6rieure 375
(Quebec 1905). For a discussion of the French commentators, see Note (1934)
9 Tulane L. Rev. 125.
19. Ga. Code Ann. (Michie, 1926) §§ 4512-13 ("joint trespassers" only);
Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) § 60-3437 (procedural statute as to joint judgments); Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930) § 484a; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby Supp. 1929)
art. 50, § 12a; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 14497 (libel cases only); Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1929) § 3268; N. C. Code Ann. (1931) § 618; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 76-101; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Gilbert-Bliss 1936 Supp.) § 211a;
Tex. Rev. Civ. Code (Vernon, 1928) § 2212; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930)
§ 5779; W. Va. Code (931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13. The broad type of statute is
illustrated by the Kentucky and Virginia acts. See Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 140, n. 66;
Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (1936).
20. Chief Justice O'Niell pointed out that such a distinction ". . . could
hardly be reconciled with the rule, in Louisiana, that only compensatory
damages, and not punitive damages, are allowable in a civil action . .
Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. at 298, 151 So. at 211 (1933).
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icy, as well as his other property, be applied first to the payment
of his debts. Several bequests were then made to five nieces who,
as legatees, sued to prevent the executor from applying the policy
proceeds to the payment of the preferred claims against the estate. Plaintiffs contended that Acts 95 and 155 of 19341 forbade
the executor to apply the proceeds of life insurance in payment
of a testator's debts even though such direction was contained in
the will. Held, that these Acts did not limit the testator's right to
dispose of the insurance by will, and consequently did not prohibit the setting aside of the proceeds for the payment of his
debts. Michiels v. Succession of Gladden, 183 So. 217 (La. 1938).
This is the first Louisiana case where the exact question has
been presented. However, authority is available in several decisions of sister states having similar statutes. 2 Only one case was
found which might possibly support the opposite view-that life
insurance proceeds in favor of the decedent's estate form no part
of his estate.3 From the language used it might be inferred that
such proceeds may not be disposed of by testament, but what the
court meant was that the proceeds were not available for payment of debts and quoad the creditors formed no part of the
estate of the deceased.4 It now seems definitely established that
the proceeds of life insurance, where the policy is payable to the
executors or administrators, or to the estate of the insured, form
part of his estate and are subject to disposal by testament like any
other part of the estate.' And the right to dispose of life insurance by will necessarily carries with it the right to set aside
the proceeds of the policy for the payment of debts.6 This reasoning is logical and its application to the Louisiana statutes seems
inescapable. If the result is undesirable, the legislature should
clearly express its intention and place the proper limits upon the
scope of the act.
1. La. Act 189 of 1914, as amended by Acts 88 of 1916, 95 of 1934, and 155
of 1934, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1937) § 4105].
2. Union Trust Co. v. Cox, 108 Tenn. 316, 67 S.W. 814 (1902); In Re Caldwell's Estate, Davidson Realty Co. v. Caldwell, 204 Iowa 606, 215 N.W. 615
(1927).
3. Succession of Aronson, 168 La. 887, 123 So. 608 (1929).
4. Cf. Succession of Erwin, 169 La. 877, 126 So. 223 (1930); Succession of
Cotton, 170 La. 828, 129 So. 361 (1930); Succession of Dumestre, 174 La. 482,
141 So. 35 (1932); Nulsen v. Herndon, 176 La. 1097, 147 So. 359, 88 A.L.R. 236
(1933); Parrott v. Sellers, 16 La. App. 595, 135 So. 73 (1931).
5. Succession of Cotton, 170 La. 828, 129 So. 361 (1930); Succession of
Dumestre, 174 La. 482, 141 So. 35 (1932); cf. Nashville Trust Co. v. First
National Bank, 123 Tenn. 617, 134 S.W. 311 (1931).
6. Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1070, 205 N.W. 870, 43 A.L.R. 567 (1925).

19381

NOTES

It has uniformly been held in other jurisdictions that the
intention to dispose of life insurance proceeds must be expressed
clearly in the will.7 Such intention is not sufficiently clear where
the will does not mention the insurance specifically but merely
directs that debts be first paid out of the estate." This viewlikewise adopted in the instant case-seems to be correct because
the purpose of the exemption statutes is to protect the wife and
children against the claims of creditors and preserve the contractural rights of the insured and of those affected by such contracts
or arrangements.9
Under most statutes there is a limitation on the amount of
the exemption, but not so in Louisiana.1" However, it was not the
purpose of the Louisiana Act to exempt the recipient of insurance
proceeds from the payment of inheritance taxes, and it has therefore been held that such taxes were not debts within the meaning
of the statute." As the law now stands, where the policy is payable to the executors or administrators, or to the estate of the
insured, the proceeds thereof are exempt from all liability for any
debt except those mentioned in the body of the Act, unless the
testator expressly subjects them to the payment of his debts.
C.D.
7. Chrisman v. Chrisman, 141 Tenn. 424, 210 S.W. 783 (1919); Cooper v.
Wright, 110 Tenn. 214, 75 S.W. 1049 (1903); Blouin v. Phaneuf, 81 Me. 176, 16
Atl. 540 (1889).
8. Cooper v. Wright, 110 Tenn. 214, 75 S.W. 1049 (1903); In re Grilk's
Will, 210 Iowa 587, 231 N.W. 327 (1930).
9. Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance (2d ed. 1930) 546.
10. Nabors, Proposals for Amendment of the Louisiana Trust Act and
the Louisiana Life Insurance Exemption Statute (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev.
522, 533.
11. Succession of Hedden, 146 So. 732, (La. App. 1932), noted in (1934)
8 Tulane L. Rev. 465.

